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BRIEF
Respondent is in error in claiming NEESHAN was
driving. See transcript Volume 1, R475-4.
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO POINTS 1 AND 2
SPECIAL VERDICTS
Respondent admits that the case was never presented
to the jury on plaintiff's theory, and attempts to excuse the
court by contending that a special verdict does not require
the court to present the case to the jury on plaintiff's theory.
The authorities do not sustain this position.
53 AM JUR 741-Section 1070
SPECIAL VERDICTS
"Questions should not 0 fail to present a matter in
issue completely."
"Negligently driven" is the only question put to jury
and did not present the issue of faulty brakes pulling the
unit to the wrong side.
53 AM JUR 746-Section 1077
«All material issues must be passed upon. 0 "
"In negligence actions where the question as to
whether or not defendants negligence was the proxi·
mate cause of the injury is at issue a special verdict
failing to find such issue is fatally defective, etc. o"
and cases cited.
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64

c J 1119

92--1 RIGHTS OF PARTIES AS TO SUBMISSION
OF DIFFERENT THEORIES
"In submitting a case on special issues each party
is entitled to have his theory of the case and the
facts constituting the cause of action, on the one
hand and the matters pleaded in defense affirmatively .submitted for the determination of the jury. 0
It is IMPERATIVE upon the court to submit all
issues made by the pleadings and evidence." and
cases cited.
The mere fact there was a stipulation that there be
a special verdict to determine liability before introduction
of evidence of damage did not waive the requirement that
the court submit the question of liability by including all
of plaintiffs requested instructions, which were proper,
particularly with respect to whether or not the faulty
brakes by excessive friction on one side drug or pulled the
tractor to the wrong side of the highway.
The interrogatory submitted by the court could not
possibly permit the jury to find on the issue of whether
the faulty brakes was the proximate cause of the tractor
going to the wrong side, or whether there was any negligence in connection with brake maintenance. Said interrogatory contained the words "negligently driven."

13 Words and Phrases 400
"to 'drive' is defined as to compel, or urge to move
in some manner or direction. Field v. Southern
Surety Co. of New York, 235 N.W. 571, 573, 211
Iowa, 1239."
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The jury were permitted to consider only one question,
namely, whether the driver negligently drove or urged or
compelled the tractor over the center line. The records
show this erroneous instruction was objected and excepted
to, and objections raised thereto in connection with the
motion for new trial. This Appellate Court is familiar with
the fact that the practices in the District Court are the
same as they were in the case the bar, namely, the court
presents the instructions to the jury and no opportunity is
given to make exceptions thereon to the reporter or the
court until after the jury has retired. This was done by
both plaintiff and the defendant at R851, so defendant
cannot complain. Nevertheless when the written instructions were handed counsel and hurriedly and partially read
just before submission. Instruction No. 4 was so obviously
offensive and obnoxious that there is no denial by the court
or counsel but that appellant nevertheless without even
being granted a hearing registered strenuous objection
and pointed out the very things discussed in this brief
even prior to submittal R230. Moreover, rule 51 states that
the Appellate Court, in its discretion and in the interests
of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an
instruction whether objected to or excepted to or the record
otherwise preserved.
Instruction No. 4 was erroneous under any conceivable
facts or circumstances. It is impossible to conceive of a
case where the jury could find that a party "negligently
drove" or negligently urged or compelled a vehicle across
the center of a highway. This would not be negligence
but an affirmative intentional act. The defendant might
be negligent in brake maintenance causing the vehicle to
be pulled to the wrong side, or might be negligent in
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speed or lookout, and lose control so that his vehicle without being driven or compelled or urged goes to the wrong
side, in fact, the driver may even be using all his power
to urge, compel or be fighting against the vehicle going
to the wrong side and yet be negligent because of faulty
brakes, speed or failure to keep a proper lookout, and
resulting loss of control.
Moreover, the jury was never instructed on what
negligent driving embraced. They were never instructed
that a "statute" required equal adjustment of the brakes,
or that ngligence might embrace any one or more of the
items included in plaintiffs requested instructions. It was
never put to the jury which vehicle crossed the center
line from any cause of negligence and was submitted on
the question only of "negligently driven."
POINT 4
Re:

TESTIMONY OF GRANT STAPLES
48 ALR 949

"the court holds that a trial court should not limit
the number of witnesses of either party, on the
only issue, or on any one of the controlling issues,
of the suit; but on collateral matters the court may,
and should, limit the number of witnesses, using
discretion in so doing."
POINT 5
EXPERTS HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS
20 AM JUR, 665, Section 793
"The rule requiring the statement of hypothetical
facts to an expert witness has no application to ques-
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tions calling for the conclusion of one who has personal knowledge of the subject of the inquiry. If
the witness called upon to give expert testimony
is acquainted with the facts of the case-that is, if
he has personal knowledge or has made personal
observation-he may give his opinion upon the basis
of his knowledge and observation in response to
direct interrogation."
Franklin Harris knew more about the facts than any
witness before the court. The authorities have better
answered respondent than counsel is able to do.

\t

POINTS 6 & 12
CROSS EXAMINATION OF SHERIFF ROBINSON
Plaintiff and appellant was entitled to show the jury
whether the Sheriff made any examination to determine if
the brakes were in equal adjustment. This was proper
where the examination of the scene as shown by the
photographs disclosed that it was obvious the brakes were
not in equal adjustment. It was entirely proper to interrogate the Sheriff on the question of whether or not he
lmew that the state law required equal adjustment, or was
even familiar with the principle th~t both sides must be
in equal adjustment. This is particularly true on cross
examination of a witness who purportedly examined the
scene as an officer of the law should when four people
had been killed.
POINT 11
JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
Respondent complains about being blasted with a
sawed off shot gun. Respondent is in this position of peril
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~car ~e recover on a rrouno ~)r a theory or HELY 0
ISE which he has directly or in effect REPUI Ih.'t"t~T
>'-'11 testimonY*''

by the facts in this case and has aptly described his own
predicament because of the cold hard facts.

p:

Respondent has elaborately treated the facts of the
case in respondent's brief. Appellant recognized the fact
that if there was any competent evidence at all upon which
the jury would be entitled to make a determination against
appellant, that appellant has no right to request this court
to grant plaintiff and appellant's motion for a directed
verdict. Appellant's motion, however, is based upon the
premises that there was no competent evidence submitted
by the defendant which could constitute a defense to the
evidence of negligence and proximate cause as submitted
by plaintiff.
32

c Js

1104

1040 CONCLUSIVENESS OF EVIDENCE
"As a general rule, a party is bound by uncontradicted evidence produced by him to prove a particular fact or facts; and where he introduces a witness to testify on his behalf he ordinarily vouches
for the credibility of his testimony, and, in the
absence of contradictory evidence, is bound by such
testimony."

1/

(£1

1. The testimony of defendant's three witnesses,
Robinson, White and Sherwood, was based on the marks
crossing the highway as seen in Exhibit F as being made
by the Studebaker. These marks were made before any
of the above three witnesses appeared t<.?_ ~~~~~~ the s~~~f
See Exhibit 14, page 4, line 28.1)5efendant produced the ~
witness Faile and is bound by his testimony. Faile in a
sworn statement, Exhibit 14, page 6, stated that these
marks were not on the highway immediately after the

-~

:Exhibit 14, defendant's witness sworn statement:,_,.;
duced
by
defendant.
See
page
Sponsored by
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crash but were made later by a Mercury automobile before
Sherwood, White, or Robinson arrived at the scene, and
were not made by the Studebaker but were made by a
Mercury, and that the Studebaker made no marks. Defendant's witness, Faile, stated in a sworn statement introduced by defendant R802-6:
Exhibit 14, page 2, line 5
"affiant did not observe these marks prior to the
time the Mercury came."
Exhibit 14, page 4, line 24
"While affiant was at the wreckage a Mercury car
came up at a terrific rate of speed threw on his
brakes and screeched his tires on the highway, came
to rest about where seats and debris was located
on the highway. Affiant recalled when the Mercury
stopped he conversed with the parties standing at
the wreckage.
How many sets of heavy skid marks can the court see?
Only one.
Who made them? According to the defendant's testimony the Mercury.
Defendant's witness Faile voluntarily and without suggestion or urging and using his best judgment identified
these marks as Mercury tire skid marks R793-19. See also
Exhibit 00 and PP. Defendant is bound by this testimony
and the same is conclusive. This eliminates the entire and
only defense offered by defendant against plaintiff's case.
There is no evidence before the court that Faile or
any one else ever contradicted the above statements. All
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evidence of these witnesses, White, Robinson and Sherwood, about these tracks is incompetent immaterial and
has no place before the jury. The court had no right to
permit the jury to speculate upon such incompetent evidence. Counsel have failed to show where the evidence
of Faile aforesaid was ever conb·adicted, so the rule of law ~
applies. This leaves defendant only with the testimony of
3
Faile, Noyes, and Someson the driver. rA.t :R731r-3l)Noyessays he could not see the position of the cars at impact and
did not see impact. Faile at R781, line 9: Did you see the
actual impact between the two vehicles, answer, No. Again
defendant's own witness, the driver of the tractor, Mr.
Someson stated A553-7.
"The way the road is down there, you don't know
whether a man is on his side of the road or not."
Someson in his depositon, :e_age 12, line 20, also stated:

/rS"Sf -1¥

~ S.SH-

/8'

"Well, I realfy didn't look.~ I was actually on the
outside of the cab before I knew anything."

Is there any competent evidence that the tractor wa-;-p
not on its wrong side at time of impact? The court can
almost take judicial notice if the fact that going around
a curve one can't tell which side of the road a car is on
as it is approaching the curve, particularly at night, and
where as there is no center line painted in. The exhibits
also bear this out. See how the Studebaker in Exhibit E
is lower than the bank and weeds on the curve and one
couldn't even see the top of the Studebaker around the
curve. Now if the driver who is elevated in the cab and
in front can't tell, how can two men in a car only 50 feet
behind this huge trailer (see R7 45-27 only 50 feet behind)

(4)
he me; de his observations &s t
1eposi ti·Jn 41-; .3
Wbs on the wrJng SlOe.
H~ st&te6:
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law
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10
see through the trailer, through the tractor and have better
vision than the driver. There is not a member of this court
who was not attempted to pass a unit like shown in the
exhibit, and it is common lmowledge that you almost have
to get entirely into the wrong lane to see around one of
these huge box cars units. This makes the testimony of
Noyes and Faile as not worthy for jury consideration and
incompetent. This leaves the defense with no competent
evidence offered in defense. In defense of what?
I. Uncontradicted and admitted negligence in relining brakes on one side of tractor only, and in violation of
manufacturer's published warning.

2. Violation of the Statute 57-7-205 (7) (C) requiring equal adjustment of brakes on opposite sides of the
tractor.
3. Uncontradicted evidence of unequal adjustment
of brakes on opposite sides by both experts and exhibits,
and all the evidence.
4. Defendant's tractor actually being pulled to wrong
side of highway and being on the wrong side of the highway. See all evidence and exhibits also uncontradicted
that tractor was on wrong side.
5. R558-15 tractor driver admitted impact knocked
feet off brakes. There are no brakes on front wheels. Impact had to be with tractor front on wrong side since rear
duals were making brake skid marks clear beyond center
line, and with the brakes off no rubber would have been
laid down by the rear duals when said duals were crossing
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over to the center of the road since the front would be
23 feet ahead of the skid marks. No explanation was given
how rear dual tractor skid marks got over to wrong side.
6. Impact of the units required movement of the rear
duals of the tractor. See R454-14 or 457-4 or 459-11. Rear
dual movement is visible. The position of rear dual movement is consistent only with th~ front of the tractor being
on wrong side of highway. It was shown that from the
center of the rear wheels of the tractor to the front bumper
was 23 feet. Measuring from the jiggle marks 23 feet along
the skid marks placed the front of the tractor on its wrong
side of the highway, and intercepted the light marks
identified as Studebaker tire marks. Staples and Bowman
likewise testified that the tractor was examined and that
when they examined the jiggle marks the distance on the
tractor when compared on the skid marks on the road
placed the front of the tractor on the wrong side, and the
damage demonstrated was consistent only with impact at
this precise angle with the tractor front on the wrong side.
7. At R549-28, R551-16 the driver of defendant's
tractor claimed the Studebaker was on its right-hand side
with its right-hand wheels off on the unpaved shoulder
when said Studebaker was 100 feet away from the tractor.
At R569-28 the driver indicated his reflexes were normal
The tractor was traveling 37 miles per hour. The Studebaker was not going any slower than 37 miles per hour.
They were approaching each other more than 110 feet per
second. Since the driver's reflexes were normal, how could
the driver even get his brakes on before the impact since
there would be more than 100 feet of traveling distance
by the two vehicles in the normal reaction time of one
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second the two units had to travel more than 110 feet and
·
there could be no brake marks before impact.
8.

Also items set forth in appellant's brief.

Under the evidence before the court, particularly
failure to reline brakes on both sides of the tractor, the
lower court should have and was bound to have given a
negligence per se instruction and judicial consideration in
the administration of justice should have required the court
to have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
WHEREFORE appellant prays that the case be not
only remanded and be reversed on all points submitted but
be remanded with instructions for the jury to determine
the damage question only under a mandate to enter a
directed verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
E. L. SCHOENHALS,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

.
~l1re claim of c1efendant rerc..rdLng spee~ of ~~,1e S{~
bf.ker does not c~Jnstitute o. defense to plaJ.ntif s c--:.
guests in the Studebaker. .· .. ore:Jver, aefenci~nt !laS nr'.
s~l)WD by competent evi<.:tence the. t the Studebo.:cer w~:;s or.
"'n· JD,Q' side so speed is i'!ILTTta terial.
1
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-13dants Exhibit 14 introduced hy defendant.
dants witness Faile in a sworn st~tement stated:
4, line 5.
~kt

the time of the impact the tractor appeared
to be at a 45D o.ngle '-Ti th the rJad* 11

lso R 787-30 anti R752-15

It is impossible to put a 2~ foot tractor at a 45°
with the road vithout completely blocking the entire
ay. See Exhibit GG. On Exhibit G~ it shows tractor
45° angle with tractor not only across the road but.
soft shoulcer. Page 4, line 8:
"After the i!llpo.ct the .tractor did not :nove over
25 feet. t!
It is impossible to have impact on tractor side of
ay and only move 25 feet. Tractor itself is 25 feet
and moved clear a.cross highway and off same.
it 14, page 4, line 10.

"He coula see the tractor swing out to the left
and assumed about a 45° angle to the highvay before he heard the noise of impact. It appeared
to be about one sec~nd in time before the tr&ctor
turned out until the impact."
The tractor was traveling 37 miles per hour or about

et per second; in one sec.1nd it w.Tuld have been on

rong siae.

Lefendant is bound by 'this testimony of his witness
him. It i. s c0ncl usi ve.

~duced b~'
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